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Joy and Autism: Biblical, Theological and Practical Perspectives 
Autism is frequently approached as a condition of functional deficit, where the 
perceived deficit is defined in terms of the individual’s measurement against a 
standard labelled as “normal.” The capacity to experience fulfilment is often 
considered to be compromised by such deficit. As part of a theological evaluation 
of autism, the concept of joy is seen to function in ways that resist such 
approaches, for the capacity for joy is not linked to any individual’s intrinsic 
capacity, but rather to the presence and purpose of God, which must take 
precedence over all other elements in the evaluation of the condition.  
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Introduction 
In this essay, I will explore some of the ways in which joy is represented in the biblical 
material as a deliberative assertion of, and response to, God’s goodness, in the face of 
the world’s values.  Joy has implications for how those shaped by the values woven 
through biblical texts inhabit that world and its experiences, including the particular 
experience of autism. The one who rejoices properly or faithfully inhabits God’s 
goodness, often in the presence of evil, and refuses the temptation to be defined by 
anything other than that goodness. As such, joy is interwoven with the moral life of 
persons and communities: it is responsive, but also deliberative, and shapes the 
practices of evaluation that each community and its members bring to bear upon their 
experiences and constitution. As these communities consider the reality of autism, 
something often represented in the negative terms of deficit or demand, a properly 
informed practice of joy has the capacity to be radically transformative. While the essay 
will involve reflection on some key texts in the New Testament, particularly the famous 
commandment to rejoice in Philippians 4:7, the concept of joy will also be informed by 
reflection upon the Book of Psalms, which has served as the principal resource for 
praise and prayer for believers through the centuries before and after the earthly 
ministry of Jesus.     
 
On Autism and its Definitions  
 
We do not here have space to give a full account of how “autism” has been understood 
through the decades in which it has been a named thing, and there would probably be 
limited value in attempting such an account. What we can more helpfully note is that an 
increasing number of voices from within the autism community have expressed concern 
at the generally negative representation or even definition of the condition. Autism has 
typically been defined in terms of functional deficit: it is described as involving a 
deficient “theory of mind” or a condition of “low empathy,” with both of these 
categories claimed to be “measured” against the “normal” population. The density of 
quotation marks in that last sentence reflects the fact that this has been accepted 
technical terminology within the literature of research on autism—which has largely 
been developed in scientific, social scientific, and clinical journals—and that many who 
are themselves autistic consider it this language to be inappropriate or incorrect.   
 One of the critical features of the “functional deficit” approach is easily 
overlooked, because it is basically assumed within modern value systems: the concept 
of functional normality or deficit is considered in terms of the capacity of the individual. 
That is, the function of the individual is measured against an external standard 
considered to be “normal” and the potential of that individual to enjoy happiness or 
fulfilment is evaluated accordingly. Often the concept of fulfillment is associated with 
the possibility of “productivity,” which introduces a social element to the definitions 
and discussion. But this social element is of limited significance and, importantly, 
remains entirely external to the individual in question. This is important, because while 
the individual may be referred to as a “person,” the concept of personhood is conceived 
entirely in individualist terms. This opens the possibility that if the individual in 
question is considered abnormal or subnormal to a sufficient extent, when judged 
against the functional standard assumed, their very status as a person can be called into 
question, examples of which will be noted below. Often, the functional standard is that 
of “autonomy,” the capacity of the individual to live without care and oversight 
provided by another individual or institution. 
  A wide range of philosophical and theological discussion—often subsumed 
under the broad term “personalism” (Smith, 2010)—has critiqued the tendency to 
identify personhood in individual terms. Charles Taylor, famously, has noted that the 
modern conception of the “self” or “person” sees the individual in self-subsistent or 
self-contained terms, as if what that individual is can be considered in isolation from the 
matrix of relationships within which that individual exists (Taylor, 2007). This is 
Taylor’s often-cited concept of the “buffered self,” which he contrasts with pre-modern 
(and non-Western) notions of the “saturated self”: the person whose being is constituted 
by a world of relationships with other persons and realities, both natural and otherwise. 
Phenomenology, as a philosophical discipline, has been particularly sensitive to this, 
developing the language of “relational ontology” to articulate the recognition that what 
a person “is”—their ontology—is inseparable from their relational matrix. The 
confusion of the lower concept of the individual with the emergent reality of the person 
(see Smith, 2010) is one that leads to distorted and distortive evaluative accounts. In 
moral philosophy, this is a key element in Alasdair MacIntyre’s analysis of the failings 
that doom contemporary ethics (MacIntyre, 1981): modern ethics have largely reified 
the individual into the entity to which rights and value are attached, but often assuming 
a functional standard against which the “personhood” of that individual can be 
measured. If they are considered to fall short of that standard, their status as persons is 
jeopardized, and with it their claim to value and rights. In medical and clinical research, 
this is reflected in the language of “normality” and “abnormality,” which is often 
deployed in its statistical sense (to indicate ranges of data), but which eventually comes 
to label the individual according to their perceived approximation of humanity. In 
autism discussions and research, this can be reflected in a use of language that attaches 
a certain sense of exceptionality to those autistic individuals who can enjoy genuine and 
productive relationships, as if they are the exceptions that prove the rule (and who are 
so only because of interventions by “normal” people).  
 Philosophy and theology have long recognized the inherent dangers in the 
language of “normalcy” or “normality”: such language is often used in the service of 
power, supporting the agendas of those in power to marginalize those with whom they 
disagree, or subconsciously expressing our preference for those who are like ourselves 
(so, famously, Foucault 1961 and 1975). Crucially, such approaches are targeted to the 
individual and their perceived intrinsic qualities.  Sometimes, such definitions of 
normality serve as the basis for decisions concerning the status and associated rights of 
the individual who is deemed “abnormal” or “deficient,” even to the extent of 
questioning their status as “persons.” Medical models that approach or define autism 
principally or largely in terms of deficit have underpinned explicit categorizations of 
autistic people as sub-personal, notably in the work of Peter Hobson (see the discussion 
in Barnbaum, 2008, and the recent online article by Loughran, 2019). Such approaches 
lead to distortive representations of the autistic person’s capacity for relationship, which 
has in turn underpinned some theological approaches that use autism as an image of 
sub-relational existence (Stump, 2010).  
 Challenging such use of “deficit” language, and its often-unintended 
implications, a movement has grown within the autism community that prefers to use 
the language of difference or diversity, with the specific term “neurodiversity” serving 
as something of a catchword for this. This neutralizes the moral assumptions within the 
concepts of normality, while still leaving space to recognize that the differences may be 
disabling for individuals, sometimes because the world’s processes are built around 
those regarded as “normal.” This diversity-based approach seeks constructively to 
highlight and disrupt the assumption of normality and, for obvious reasons, has often 
aligned with similar movements related to other experiences of diversity (ethnicity and 
sexuality).  
 This intersects in interesting ways with the use of the concept of joy in the 
biblical material, which often has a somewhat disruptive or surprising quality: we would 
normally expect a certain set of circumstances or experiences to elicit joy in those able 
to enjoy them, but the concept often runs counter to such expectations, dissociating joy 
from them and reattaching it to circumstances that we might expect to bring only 
misery. In doing so, it slices across the values of normalcy themselves and this has to be 
allowed to inform a theological evaluation of the autistic experience, as well as 
speaking into that experience.  
But the concept of joy, approached in biblical and theological terms, moves 
beyond this disruption of expectations to a more thoroughgoing reorientation of the 
perceived basis for happiness and fulfillment. Where, as we have seen, “fulfillment” is 
typically approached as something made possible by the functional capacity of the 
individual, defined according to a presumed standard of normality, the biblical concept 
of joy attaches the possibility of fulfillment to the presence of God and his involvement 
in the economy of his dealings with all that is outside of Godself. This is true for all 
creatures, not just those who might be seen to lack something that others have. The 
deliberative or intentional quality of joy, as it is represented in the Bible, begins to 
highlight this essential difference from modern notions of fulfillment.     
Joy as a Deliberative State: The Commandment to Rejoice 
In Philippians 4:4, Paul famously instructs the church in Philippi: 
Rejoice in the Lord always. I will say it again: Rejoice!1  
Chairete en kyriō pantote; palin erō, chairete 
This is not the first time he has issued this instruction to his readers in this letter; he 
does so also in Phil 3:1. Interestingly, in both cases, the instruction to rejoice is 
closely—even causally—linked to a protection of some sort from moral evil. In 3:1, 
Paul follows his exhortation to rejoice with these words: 
Finally, my brothers, rejoice in the Lord! It is no trouble for me to write the 
same things to you again, and it is a safeguard for you (hymin de asphales). 
 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from the Bible are taken from the 1984 version of 
The Holy Bible, New International Version® NIV®. Copyright © 1973 1978 1984 2011 by 
Biblica, Inc. TM. Used by permission. All rights reserved worldwide. 
Even if these words anticipate the guidelines that follow, which contain specific pieces 
of moral advice, their close apposition to the joy-imperative seems to associate it with 
the function of a “safeguard.” When Paul reiterates and repeats the commandment in 
Phil 4:4, he expands the positive exhortation with a further directive to engage in 
petitionary prayer about the causes of worry, a directive that is paired with its negative 
corollary, that anxiety cannot be allowed to remain unchecked: 
Do not be anxious about anything, but in everything, by prayer and petition, 
with thanksgiving, present your requests to God. (Phil 4:6) 
Given that anxiety commonly co-occurs with autism, it may be important to note an 
important point of grammar that is somewhat obscured in English translation. The form 
used here (a negated present imperative) is often associated with commandments or 
prohibitions that disallow the continuation of a particular activity, rather than its 
initiation (which would normally be prohibited using an aorist subjunctive). While this 
point of grammar cannot be taken as a strict rule, it is probably relevant to the 
interpretation of this verse, which is really concerned with whether anxiety is allowed to 
continue unaddressed, or is challenged by the intentional practice of joy. In other words, 
we do not break the injunction simply because we have begun to feel anxious, but only 
when we allow anxiety to remain and to escalate, with all its destructive effects.  
The prohibition of anxiety and exhortation to prayer leads directly to another 
statement concerning the protective quality of peace: 
And the peace of God, which transcends all understanding, will guard your 
hearts and your minds in Christ Jesus. (Phil 4:7) 
That the act of rejoicing appears so closely linked to the protection of hearts and minds 
is more significant than we might initially appreciate. While today the heart is often 
popularly seen as the seat of emotion, and the mind as the seat of the intellect or 
rationality, both body parts were, in classical terms, associated with processes of 
cognition and volition. To protect the heart and mind is not simply to have emotions and 
beliefs protected, as moderns might assume, but to have volitional decisions and 
perceptions guarded from the values that would distort them. This association of 
rejoicing with perceptive and volitional cognition is reflected in the following verse, 
where Paul continues by asking his addressees to think about whatever is good, lovely 
and praiseworthy (Phil 4:8) and then to implement what Paul has taught (Phil 4:9), in 
order to enjoy the presence of “the God of peace,” a title that links back to Phil 4:7, with 
its reference to the peace that “transcends all understanding (nous).”  
 On one level, to describe God’s peace as something that “transcends all 
understanding” is to acknowledge that it is not subject to the kinds of logic by which we 
would normally consider a situation conducive to peace. As such, it challenges the 
validity of those logics themselves. It also, however, represents the peace in question as 
something that is not contingent upon a particular kind of cognition: the capacity to 
enjoy this peace does not rest upon a particular cognitive or noetic state—we do not 
need to be cognitively able in order to enjoy it. In fact, by linking this peace to the 
active presence of the God of peace, in Phil 4:9, the text depicts peace as something that 
originates outside of the individual self or mind state; specifically, peace emerges from 
the presence of the God of peace.    
 I begin with these observations about the biblical commandment to rejoice 
because they jar somewhat with contemporary discourse, where joy is typically seen as 
entirely and spontaneously responsive to conducive circumstances, as these are 
experienced by one who conforms to a particular pattern of ability. This is often 
associated with a particular set of assumptions about what it means to be “fulfilled.” As 
we shall see below, joy is indeed properly understood as a response to God, but it is not 
necessarily a spontaneous one. Rather, it is a deliberative one: it is something that can 
be the content of a commandment, as here, because the person or community can 
commit themselves intentionally and consciously to the act of rejoicing. This 
deliberative act, moreover, is represented as a nodal act, one that redirects other 
cognitive events, whether epistemic or volitional. Those who rejoice thereby evaluate 
and decide more “safely”: their perceptions and choices are altered for the better by 
their commitment to joy. Without pressing this observation too far, we might also notice 
that Paul’s commandments are plural in form: he writes to a community or group and 
expects this too affect the way that the group thinks.  
Rejoice in the Lord: The Object, Context and Source of Response 
Joy is not an abstracted concept of happiness in the biblical material. The 
commandment in Philippians 4:4 is not nakedly an exhortation to be happy, but rather to 
rejoice “in the Lord.” When considered in relation to Paul’s broader theology, and in 
relation to the wider biblical material, this act of defining joy as “in the Lord” can be 
seen to have three linked elements.   
First, “the Lord” is the object of joy, the thing to which attention is directed that 
elicits such a response. Contextually, in Paul’s letter to the Philippians, the command is 
an acknowledgement of the temptation to look to other objects of attention or 
performance as sources of joy or fulfillment in their own right, taken apart from their 
value as gifts from God. Following the first occurrence of the exhortation, in Philippians 
3:1, Paul warns against “the mutilators”—those who put their confidence “in the flesh” 
(3:2–3)—before continuing to narrate his own participation in such a value system. The 
reference to “mutilators” probably indicates the groups pressing for the observance of 
traditional Jewish practices such as circumcision, but Paul’s list of his own reasons for 
boasting moves beyond this and points to various claims to status that he previously 
considered to be “gain.” These constitute what we might today think of as social or 
symbolic capital: the things true of Paul (or how he is perceived) that caused people to 
think of him as more significant or valuable than others. Contextually, the proximity of 
this account to the command “rejoice in the Lord” suggests a deliberate focus of 
attention upon the Lord as source of joy, rather than upon such social capital.  
This theme is widely found in the Psalms, often linked to the theme not just of 
divine provision or providence, but of divine presence: 
 
But let all who take refuge in you be glad; 
 let them ever sing for joy. 
  Spread your protection over them.   
 that those who love your name may rejoice in you. Psa. 5:11 
 
You have made known to me the path of life; 
 you will fill me with joy in your presence, 
 with eternal pleasures at your right hand. Psa. 16:11   
 
Surely you have granted him eternal blessings 
 and made him glad with the joy of your presence. Psa. 21:6  
 
Joy, here, is a corollary of God’s acknowledged presence.  
Second, the qualifier “in the Lord” points to the Lord as the context in which the 
act of rejoicing takes place. This reflects a theme that can be traced across the New 
Testament writings, that the union established between Jesus and his people (by which 
they are in turn united to God) is properly described in terms of inclusion or belonging: 
we are not simply followers of Christ, but are represented as his “members” (cf. 1 Cor 
12). Our joy is precisely his joy, because is it the joy experienced within his body. Paul, 
in particular, develops a rich account of the Christian community in such terms, using 
prepositions that reflect this emphasis on belonging (particularly his favoured term, “in 
Christ”, see Campbell, 2012), which is what we see here. Across the New Testament, 
however, we can trace a similar emphasis, often developed through distinctive 
metaphors, such as John’s image of the vine and its branches, and the image of the 
community as temple, found explicitly in Acts 15 and in 1 Peter 2. For the present 
essay, this is relevant because it highlights the intersection of the theme of joy with that 
of belonging. We will unpack the significance of this below.  
As a corollary of this, we can note a third implication of the construction 
“Rejoice in the Lord,” which is that the Lord—as the Head and Source of the 
community’s life and identity—is the source of the joy itself. Joy does not 
spontaneously spring up from our own resources, but is itself a gift shared with us by 
God. This again reflects some of the themes that we see elsewhere in Scripture, notably 
in the Psalms, where joy is seen as something given by God: 
You have filled my heart with greater joy 
 than when their grain and new wine abound. (Psa. 4:7) 
You turned my wailing into dancing; 
 you removed my sackcloth and clothed me with joy.  Psa. 30:11                
While these observations are essentially framing considerations for a proper theology of 
joy, they are immediately relevant to how we approach or experience autism joyfully. 
First, the proper theological starting point for thinking about autism is thinking about a 
God who is the cause and source of joy, a good God. In the terms of Christian theology, 
we must consider autism in terms of divine economy (God’s dealings in creation, 
providence and redemption with all that is outside of Godself), as something graced by 
God’s care and presence, before we consider it in relation to earthly economies and 
human experiences that are commonly labelled as “normal.” This is particularly 
important, because human “normality” will always become an alienating, excluding and 
diminishing concept—a form of ableism that sees “abnormality” always in terms of 
deficit or deviation—if it is not carefully framed by theology proper, that is, by the 
assertion of God’s goodness as a prolegomenon to all attempts to ascribe value.  
Furthermore, theological challenges to ableism need to be rightly grounded.  If 
we are attentive to the biblical treatment of joy, we will not seek to begin with a 
reconceiving of God as disabled, a God with whom we can identify our frailties (contra 
the approach of Eiesland, 1994); rather, we will begin with reflection upon a Holy God 
who can resource creatures (all creatures, not just those who are disabled) in their 
frailties. The key to this is a proper affirmation of the humility of God—his powerful 
willingness to make himself present with those of all status (cf Pardue, 2013; Macaskill, 
2018)—and not a confusion of the categories of creature and creator intended to make 
God seem more relatable. The problems with such as approach are effectively probed 
by Kathryn Tanner, who notes the modern tendency to extinguish transcendence in 
accounts of how God relates to the creation and its history (Tanner, 2001). Paul’s 
commandment to rejoice, and his description of the peace that is associated with this 
joy, seems to make no concessions to such an approach; rather, it is in line with the 
biblical tendency to affirm divine transcendence and plenitude as the grounds for hope.     
Joy as Economically Subversive: Rejoice Always and Give Thanks for All 
Things 
The command to “rejoice in the Lord always” has a somewhat subversive function that 
we must not pass over too quickly. We might consider “hope” to be an appropriate 
condition to occupy when we are in a difficult economic situation, because this involves 
a conviction that a period of present distress will not last. Indeed, there are some points 
in the Psalms where a future joy is anticipated with hope: 
Weeping may remain for a night, but rejoicing comes in the morning. (Psalm 
30:15)  
At multiple points in Scripture, notably in the prophetic writings, an eschatological 
future is represented as a time characterized by joy, as in Isaiah: 
You will go out in joy and be led forth in peace; the mountains and hills will 
burst into song before you,  and all the trees of the field  will clap their hands. 
(Is. 55:12)     
Then you will look and be radiant, your heart will throb and swell with joy; the 
wealth on the seas will be brought to you, to you the riches of the nations will 
come. (Is. 60:5)     
As the second of these quotations, written from the standpoint of national ruin, 
indicates, such expectations of future joy often involve a hope that current economic 
conditions will be reversed: the powerful will be brought down and the poor will be 
raised up, enjoying the wealth of those who once oppressed them. Joy and hope are 
thereby coordinated. 
 But Paul’s command to rejoice always is patently directed towards the reframing 
and revaluing of present circumstances, and this demands of the one who rejoices a 
commitment to seeing those circumstances in different terms. This becomes clear in the 
following verses. Paul first articulates his grateful joy at the renewal of concern that the 
Philippians have expressed for him, presumably in relation to the possibility of a gift or 
of support (4:10). He disclaims any need, 
 
for I have learned to be content whatever the circumstances.  I know what it is to 
be in need, and I know what it is to have plenty. I have learned the secret of 
being content in any and every situation, whether well fed or hungry, whether 
living in plenty or in want. I can do everything through him who gives me 
strength. (Phil 4:11–13). 
Again, the premise of contentment—apparently in parallel with rejoicing—lies neither 
in Paul’s own state of being, or in his circumstances, but in the presence of the God who 
gives strength. This is not to say that there is not an orientation towards a transformed 
future for Paul, but what he points to here as the grounds for his contentment and joy is 
something already present.  
 A similar sentiment is expressed in 1 Thessalonians 5:16–18. There, Paul writes: 
Be joyful always; pray continually; give thanks in all circumstances, for this is 
God’s will for you in Christ Jesus. 
The parallelism of thought with Philippians 4 is quite striking, which is all the more 
striking because the earlier part of the chapter has been concerned with the expectation 
of Christ’s return, and of the eschatological upheaval that will accompany it. 
 When brought to bear on the systems by which we ascribe economic value to 
people or to circumstances, this is fundamentally subversive. Often, our language of 
“normality” decides on a particular embodiment of functionality or on a particular 
notion of fulfillment that becomes the measure of the person’s perceived worth or 
potential. If one deviates from this measure, one is considered less valuable or 
important. If one can never attain to certain possible outcomes, one is considered 
doomed. The approximation of these measures by the disabled may be celebrated as a 
kind of “overcoming” or as a sort of near-normality, but it is always labelled as lesser to 
the experience of those who see themselves as normal. In some cases, such evaluations 
lead to the conclusion that the person’s life is simply not worth having. But Paul’s 
representation of joy, drawing as it does upon the biblical traditions, refuses to allow 
such economical decisions to be made on the basis of the individual’s approximation of 
“normality” or the circumstances they will experience. Joy is premised on participation 
in the divine economy. We might suggest that this has some implications for concepts 
such as “quality of life” or “family quality of life,” which are often deployed in the 
statistical analysis of circumstances. At least in theological discourse, the extent to 
which these measures are wrapped up in modern economical ways of ascribing value 
needs to be recognized.  
Joy and Autism: A Concluding Synthesis. 
While we have offered some comments along the way in this essay, to consider how our 
findings might relate to autism, we are now in a position to draw some threads together 
by way of concluding synthesis.  
 First, the concept of joy—understood in terms informed by biblical and 
theological material—demands that a theological evaluation of autism refuses to 
measure value according to a standard of individual function or fulfillment. As we have 
seen, autism is commonly conceived as a condition of functional deficit, where the 
individual and their capacities are measured against an external standard of function and 
fulfilment. While there is a “social” aspect to such approaches, this is still understood in 
terms of the capacity of the individual to participate in social interactions, or to 
contribute to a social good through their productivity. The concept of joy that we have 
studied above, however, does not begin with any model of value that is reducible to 
individuals and the capacities that they are judged to have. Importantly, this is equally 
true of the “able” person and the “disabled” person: the capacity for joy is not 
determined by the condition of the individual, but by the locatedness of that individual 
within a world saturated by God’s presence and goodness. This cuts equally across our 
association of fulfillment with productivity. When a thing—any thing—is located 
within an economy of gift and grace, its state of fulfillment or the attainment of its 
telos—can no longer be evaluated in terms of its capacity to generate other things for 
the consumption of the group (productivity), but in terms of its participation in God’s 
sharing of life with the creation. There is no space in such discourse for labels such as 
“high functioning” and “low functioning,” for they are defined in relation to some 
notion of social productivity. It is simply meaningless to speak of a “high-” or “low 
functioning” participant in grace, or to speak of “high-“ or “low functioning creatures.” 
This would seem to have significant implications for those theological approaches to 
autism that have bought into and built upon the functional deficit model, such as that of 
Stump (Stump, 2010) and McFall (McFall, 2016).    
 Second, groups that take seriously the commandment to “rejoice in the Lord 
always,” with its subversive economic overtones, should be shaped by the deliberative 
processes involved in the commandment, so that their valuing of autistic persons in their 
midst is based on the principle of gift, rather than those principles of function and 
productivity that mark clinical approaches to autism. Yet, and this is vital to note, the 
very fact that the exhortation to rejoice is a commandment, that it involves deliberation 
and does not happen spontaneously, highlights that our natural or instinctive values 
need to be volitionally addressed. It is both naïve and misleading to expect that churches 
will automatically be safe places for autistic people and their families, wherein those 
with autism will be properly valued and treated accordingly. Rather, they will be places 
where typical value systems continue to be operate, but are continually exposed by the 
values of faith, provided the commandment to rejoice in the Lord always is taken 
seriously.  
 Third, while there is indeed an eschatological dimension to joy, which points 
forward to a time of reversal and transformation, this cannot be allowed to define our 
notions of joy in ways that displace or efface its radically re-evaluative implications for 
our present condition. For autism, in particular, this is important. It is common in 
Christian circles for autism (like disability, in general) to be seen as something presently 
debilitating, which will be transformed in an eschatological future. The relevance of joy, 
in this case, would be that of the one who rejoices in the knowledge that the present 
time, and all of its frailties, is not the final or permanent condition in which we will 
remain. But while there is clearly an anticipation of future transformation in the New 
Testament (as in, for example, 1 Cor 15), and a proper emphasis on hope, it is only by 
extrapolation and by assumption that we can see this as a time when all disability will 
cease to be: the Scriptural texts do not clearly indicate this to be the case. For many 
within the autistic community, just as for many with disabilities, the prospect of the 
condition being eradicated in the eschaton is actually a troubling one, since it is so 
foundational to their identity. This is not to say that every disability will continue into 
the eschaton, but rather to acknowledge two things. First, the disabling that is part of the 
autistic experience often has its origins in the way the world is constructed to suit non-
autistic identity, rather than in autism itself. What may change in the eschaton is the 
world, and its value system, so that the “autistic gain” is rightly appreciated. In a real 
sense, conditions may cease to be disabilities, for the values and priorities in the 
external world that result in persons being functionally disabled by their conditions may 
be transformed; but the conditions themselves may remain.  Second, our notions of 
healing and wholeness are often subverted by the modern preoccupation with autonomy 
and self-subsistence, and not simply shaped by the appropriate hope for a life without 
pain. If we allow that this preoccupation may cause us to dismiss the proper experiences 
of creaturehood as sub-optimal, or even as sub-human, then we can begin to see how 
our hope itself is distorted by a particularly modern lens. If the concept of joy is 
properly understood as something that re-values present circumstances by relating them 
to the economy and presence of God, the possibility that these circumstances and 
conditions will extend into the eschaton actually ceases to be unthinkable, even as our 
hope for a world in which the healing and the justice of God are manifest grows.  
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